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Abstract. With the advent of communicating machines in the form of embod-
ied agents the question gets ever more interesting under which circumstances 
such systems could be attributed some sort of consciousness and self-identity. 
We are likely to ascribe to an agent with human appearance and conducting 
reasonable natural language dialog that it has desires, goals, and intentions. 
Taking the example of ‘Max’, a humanoid agent embodied in virtual reality, 
this contribution examines under which circumstances an artificial agent could 
be said to have intentional states and perceive others as intentional agents. We 
will link our examination to the question of how such a system could have self-
awareness and how this is grounded in its (virtual) physis and its social context. 
We shall discuss how Max could be equipped with the capacity to differentiate 
between his own and a partner’s mental states and under which conditions Max 
could reasonably speak of himself as ‘I’. 
Keywords: embodied agents, intentional states, machine consciousness, self-
knowledge, emotion, memory  
1   Preliminaries 
A lot of people talk to their computer – mostly if it doesn’t work as desired. This is 
certainly by no means true communication with the machine, which need not be 
explained further. Research into artificial intelligence aims, among other things, at en-
abling machines (or even machine ‘beings’) to communicate with people as genuinely 
and naturally as possible. This requires, first of all, machines that are able to perceive 
and represent their environment, draw conclusions and act accordingly. 
Evaluating whether communication between a human being and a machine may 
actually be possible depends on what is to be understood precisely by ‘communica-
tion’. If it is supposed to be transferring information that makes the receiver change 
its behavior, then even pushing the button that releases the copying machine from 
stand-by to action may be considered human-machine communication. In this sense 
the term is, in fact, used in the engineering sciences. If, however, both communicating 
partners are required to be systems acting autonomously and making use of a common 
repertoire of signs in order to inform each other or to negotiate deals, this seemed, 
first of all, rather limited to humans. The communicating partners might even be 
expected to perceive themselves – as well as each other – as intentional agents, and to 
be conscious of themselves and the other.  
With the advent of communicating machines in the form of embodied agents the 
question gets ever more interesting whether such systems could have some sort of 
consciousness and self-identity in a foreseeable future. It is tempting to ascribe an 
agent which has human appearance and which can conduct reasonable natural lan-
guage dialog that it has certain beliefs and desires, pursues certain goals, and behaves 
rationally in the sense that it will act to further its goals in the light of its beliefs. That 
is, we are likely to conduct such a dialog from the intentional stance [10]. But still, 
even when our artificial opposite had a name to which it attends and called itself ‘I’, 
we would assume that attributing the agent consciousness is inadequate at the given 
time.  
In the case of human beings, the term consciousness describes the fact that we are 
aware of our thoughts and sensations. Our thinking, feeling and will are – more or less 
well – available to us and, by way of language, we are even able to communicate this 
(more or less well) to others. At a closer look, the somewhat colorful concept of con-
sciousness is differentiated into quite different forms1. Firstly, there is a conscious-
ness of sensations: human beings are aware of the quality of what they experience, 
e.g. how it feels to touch something or feel pain. Secondly, there is a consciousness as 
being aware of oneself: people know of their physical existence and identity, e.g. they 
recognize themselves in a mirror. This knowledge is rooted in the perception of one’s 
own body, which we can touch to confirm that we exist and which establishes our-
selves in the environment. 
And thirdly, perception of our physical self, our body and its position in the 
environment is presumably the basis for our self-perception as an acting being that 
employs means to pursue goals, even if these are shifted to abstract realms (how to 
reach my goal = how to get there). This includes being conscious of oneself as a 
subject of experience, relating one’s feelings and thoughts to one’s own body and 
mind and knowing that oneself has caused the effects of actions. This still does not 
mean, though, that one has to refer to oneself as ‘I’ or must even have the ability to 
talk, as will be shown later.  
The action perspective, however, is essential to this view, for actions cause 
changes in the world, whether intentional or unintentional. Actions may have success 
or fail depending on whether goals aimed at are achieved or not. If an action is 
successful we are happy, if it isn’t we may feel angry. In particular this also applies to 
communicative actions that constitute the special topic of this contribution. If I tell 
someone else that ‘my knee hurts’ this is – different from an involuntary ‘ouch’ – 
intentional communicative acting. It is intended to inform the other person about my 
condition, and I am convinced that he (or she) is able to understand me and my 
feelings and it is my desire that he should feel sorry for me. I might even expect the 
other one to offer help. 
When communicating with each other, human beings assign each other such ‘inner 
life’ (intentional states). Analogous to ourselves, we assume that the other person has 
intentions, beliefs, desires and goals, which we cannot identify directly, however. We 
imply that they are there, though, since the other person is a being equally thinking 
and feeling. And we communicate with the aim of influencing the internal states and 
thus the actions of the other person. This may be successful or fail. The other person 
                                                           
1 We shall relate these ideas, put forward here for motivation, to research literature in Section 3. 
may stick to her opinion that I am feeling well – although I am telling her that my 
knee hurts – if she doesn’t actually see me limp. Or she believes that my knee hurts 
although I have only pretended pain, i.e., beliefs may be false. 
Human beings possess the ability to recognize in others not only an object of the 
environment but an acting subject, an image of ourselves, but with its own perspective 
and intentions. We can even develop a mental model of our communication partner, 
making assumptions – possibly false ones – about the other’s beliefs, desires, and 
intentions (‘Theory of Mind’; see also Krämer [16]). Developing such representation 
of the other – a ‘partner model’ – is only possible due to the fact that intentional states 
have contents that can be expressed in the form of statements (she knows I am very 
busy, she wants me to come home earlier today, she wants me to go with her to the 
movies tonight, etc.). Such representation requires symbols of some kind as ‘thought 
signs’, which carry contents that form the basis of our logical thinking and rational 
acting.  
Being able to not only understand others as intentional agents but also to reason 
about their thoughts and goals requires a high degree of consciousness, which – as 
many researchers believe – is coupled to symbolic representations of the world (but 
see [2] for discussion). We shall in the following firstly investigate whether and under 
what circumstances artificial systems can be justifiably attributed intentional states, 
i.e. can have intentional states. Secondly, given certain cognitive conditions, are 
machines able to know about themselves, and are they capable of understanding 
intentions and perspectives of a dialog partner? Before discussing this, two additional 
aspects shall be addressed that are closely linked to consciousness, namely, emotion 
and memory. 
As already mentioned above, our feelings play a decisive role when evaluating the 
success of an action. Even more, emotions are considered to be a basic condition for 
organized action in modern theories of cognition. Among other things, emotion is 
understood to be a control medium of the cognitive system to regulate attention 
directed to incoming stimuli in order to differentiate between important and 
unimportant matters. The fact that one becomes aware of something is apparently in 
major parts connected to affective experiencing. Moreover, emotions are of essential 
importance to the ability of differentiating between various options for actions (see 
Damasio [9]), as well as for the significance of experiences that affect our memories 
more permanently. In the case of human beings, storing information is closely 
connected with the affective appraisal but also, on the other hand, with the realization 
that the event concerned is very special or rare. This observation indicates that not 
only emotion but also memory constitutes an important aspect of consciousness. 
Our experiencing would be incomplete and the awareness we have of ourselves 
would not be very profound, if our mind were not equipped to store memories – in 
particular those that concern ourselves, something we have experienced just before, or 
experienced yesterday or a long time ago. Generally, we are able to access our per-
sonal past, an ability that has been called autobiographical memory; cf. Conway and 
Pleydell-Pearce [8]. This is the basis of a form of consciousness called ‘autonoetic’ 
(knowing of oneself) allowing us to imagine our identity – uncoupled from current 
experiences – in the past and the future. Studies of patients with impaired conscious-
ness and impaired memory suggest a connection between autonoetic consciousness 
and memory, in particular episodic memory; cf. Markowitsch [18]. 
In the section to follow we will introduce ‘Max’ [14], an artificial humanoid agent 
embodied in virtual reality (see also [13]). To examine the questions raised above, we 
will then turn to current research discussions of how an artificial system could have 
consciousness and self-awareness. Finally, we will discuss the conditions under which 
Max could reasonably speak of himself as ‘I’. As we go along, we shall sketch 
starting points for the technical realization of such conditions and also discuss the 
roles of emotion and memory. 
2   Who is Max? 
“Could you imagine Max being conscious of himself one day?”, I was asked on a 
conference some time ago. Earlier in the meeting, I had presented our Bielefeld works 
on a ‘situated artificial communicator’ called Max. Max is an artificial agent (a 
‘virtual human’) communicating with his human opposite verbally and through body 
language, with gestures and mimic. Resembling human appearance he can be met in 
our laboratory in the setting of a three-dimensional computer graphics projection. 
Max helps us investigate in detail the basics of communicative intelligence and how it 
is possible to describe it – in parts – so precisely that a machine can be made to 
simulate it (the virtual human Max is a program-controlled software-machine). This 
means that collecting insights about the functioning of human communication is an 
important focus of our work. A technical goal is also the construction of a system as 
functional and convincing as possible that may be applied in different ways.2 
Our research scenario deals with the cooperative construction of objects, such as an 
airplane from a Baufix wooden toykit. This is to test whether Max shows a kind of 
‘understanding’ in changing situations that enables him to perform a dialog with a 
human being. Even if he may not be taken for a human being, Max is intended to 
show forms of communication that are familiar to us, look into our face when talking 
or listening, gesticulate naturally, look enquiringly if he does not understand us and – 
before talking himself – he should wait till we have finished.  
The human and Max are opposing each other, for instance at a table (see Figure 1). 
With the exception of the person shown left, the pictured scene is projected virtual 
reality. On the table, there are different building bricks, three- and five-hole bars, 
several screws with colored caps, a cube with holes on all sides etc., all items will be 
assembled in the course of the dialog. The human sees Max and the entire setting 
three-dimensionally by means of stereo glasses and hears the synthetic voice of Max 
due to surround sound from hidden speakers. Max ‘sees’ the human, his gaze 
direction as well as hand and arm movements by means of an infrared tracking system 
and cordless data gloves, and – via a radio microphone – he ‘hears’ him speak which 
he processes with a speech recognizer. Both the human and Max are able to have in-
dividual parts assembled by natural language instructions and gestures, carried out in 
simulation with realistic sounds added. This is done, for example, as follows: 
                                                           
2 Since January 2004, Max has been performing at the Heinz Nixdorf Museums-Forum in 
Paderborn where he informs visitors – in a dialog situation – on all things to know about one 
of the exhibition areas and the computer museum. It is the first time Max came into real-life 
application. 
           
Fig. 1.  Cooperative dialog with Max.                             Fig. 2.  Max, unpleasantly touched.  
Max:  Hello, I’m Max. How can I help you? [smiling]. 
Human:  Explain the assembly of a propeller. 
Max:  Let’s do it together. First, a screw has to be inserted into the middle of a 
three-hole-bar. 
Human:  Insert the yellow screw into the bar [points to a three-hole-bar, the first 
screw is inserted into the first hole]. 
Max:  No, that was the wrong hole [screw slips out]. 
Max:  I’ll explain it to you again. A screw has to be inserted into the middle of a 
three-hole-bar. 
Human:  Insert the screw into the middle of the three-hole-bar [screw is inserted into 
the middle of the three-hole-bar chosen before]. 
Max:  Okay, that’s correct. Now insert this into the three-hole-bar [points to the bar 
with the screw]. 
Human:  You do it. 
Max:  Okay, I will perform the action [the objects are connected as instructed]. 
Max:  And now the bars need to be turned crosswise to each other [shows the 
rotation using a gesture] etc. 
 
The cognitive architecture the virtual human Max is based on will be explained in a 
later section. Just this much: Max knows some grammatical rules and makes use of a 
semantic lexicon for translating the meaning of words in order to represent the 
meaning of his opposite’s utterances in the form of symbolic descriptions using 
compositional and reference semantics. Within a limited vocabulary, Max is able to 
talk and coordinate his gestures due to his flexible body. Simulated facial muscles 
enable him to express ‘emotional conditions’ (see Figure 2), which – among other 
things – are influenced by achieving or failing communicative goals. Max’s verbal 
utterances are produced from a repertoire of stereotype expressions by adapting their 
parameters to the current situation – including the generation of appropriate gestures. 
This also includes the term ‘I’, without Max having a notion of himself (at the current 
time).  
In the theory of communicative action, these dialog expressions could be seen as 
actions in the proper sense only against the background of attributing intentional 
states. This means, e.g., Max ought to have a mental state of some kind such as ‘wants 
to have an answer’, to make his initial question ‘genuine’ communication. First of all, 
Max’s body movements, too, are (simulated) physical events. Only in connection with 
an intended communicative function (as represented in the form of goals) would they 
gain importance as gestural actions, i.e., only by the fact that a sequence of individual 
movements is projected and carried out in line with a currently represented mental 
state of a communicative goal. Seen from the philosophical angle, they would be 
attributed the status of actions only if Max were able to perform his dialog from the 
first-person perspective. Would it thus be possible for Max to have that kind of 
consciousness of his self? Before trying an answer, a brief overview of the state of 
research into ‘machine consciousness’ will be given. 
3   Consciousness in Artificial Systems? 
The question as to whether machines are able to develop forms of consciousness has 
been a topical subject within artificial intelligence, the neurosciences and, not least, in 
the philosophy of mind. Research into ‘machine consciousness’ is expected to yield 
also further insights on human consciousness. In particular we might find it somewhat 
strange to attribute a human-like opposite a profound ability to communicate, if he 
were not able to reasonably speak of himself as ‘I’. This would require, however, to 
configurate the artificial agent accordingly, so as to enable him to adopt a first-person 
perspective. After outlining a few research approaches towards this subject, different 
forms of ‘self-knowledge’ will be discussed in particular. 
3.1   Machine Consciousness  
Machine consciousness projects can be placed along a spectrum, one of its poles 
represented by modeling physical brain processes. The digital neuromodels by Igor 
Aleksander, for instance, are based on the theory that brain cells balance sensory input 
in a way that allows them to consistently represent real-world objects, in other words, 
they encode a neuronal depiction of the exterior world; cf. Aleksander, Morton, and 
Dumall [1]. The other pole is the embedding of preprogrammed rules for controlling 
the behavior of an artificial agent; e.g., Sloman [26]. Roughly in the middle between 
both extremes, there is the Global Workspace theory of Baars [3], [4] positing that 
consciousness emerges if multiple sensory inputs trigger neural mechanisms, which 
compete to ascertain the most logical response to the inputs. The “Intelligent 
Distribution Agent (IDA)” model by Franklin and Graesser [12], for instance, is based 
on this hypothesis. 
Research approaches towards modeling mental states and practical reasoning are 
frequently based on functional models of planning and choosing actions by means-
ends analysis, mainly in versions of the belief-desire-intention paradigm (BDI); cf. 
Rao and Georgeff [22]. The BDI approach comes from Michael Bratman [7]; one of 
its fundamentals can be traced back to the work of Daniel Dennett [10] on the 
behavior of intentional systems. The basic idea is the description of the internal 
working state of an agent by means of intentional states (beliefs, desires, intentions) 
as well as the layout of a control architecture that allows the agent to choose rationally 
a sequence of actions on the basis of their representations. By recursively elaborating 
a hierarchical plan structure, specific intentions are generated until, eventually, 
executable actions are obtained; cf. Wooldridge [29]. Identification and representation 
of beliefs, desires and intentions are also useful for analyzing the behavior of artificial 
agents that communicate with humans or other artificial agents; see Rao and Georgeff 
[23]. 
Modeling intentional states is based on their symbolic representation. One of its 
assets is the flexibility it provides for planning and reasoning. In beliefs, for instance, 
facts concerning the world may be stored that an agent is not (or no longer) able to 
perceive at the moment, which, however, are to affect his further planning. An agent 
being able to pursue his goals not only in the light of currently perceived information 
but also with reference to world knowledge, remembered past and anticipated future 
will be superior to other agents that do not possess this ability. Even in view of the 
continuing debate on the significance of symbolic representations for human intelli-
gence it is reasonable to assume that humans represent intentional states symbolically 
and draw their conclusions on this basis. 
It is a difference, though, whether an agent draws conclusions simply on the basis 
of his beliefs and desires or whether he makes use of them – with a corresponding 
description – for drawing conclusions, recognizing them to be his own. In many cases 
such differentiation may not have functional advantages. An agent should be ex-
pected, however, to represent his intentional states explicitly as being his own ones, if 
he must also record and deal specifically with other agents’ intentional states. Agents 
are going to communicate with the intention of changing the inner states of other 
agents, i.e. their beliefs and intentions. Given a favourable situation, an agent being 
‘conscious’ of his goals may realize them in an opportunistic way. 
3.2   Physically Grounded Self-Knowledge (Anderson and Perlis) 
From the philosophical point of view, consciousness develops if an agent constructs a 
model of himself and integrates it into his model of the world [11], [19]. It is a 
frequently discussed question whether this requires a certain linguistic competence 
and, in particular, the capacity of using in self-representations an indexical symbol 
(‘I’) that refers to oneself. According to Anderson and Perlis [2], usage of an 
indexical symbol is not imperative for an agent – whether human or artificial – for 
being able to recognize oneself as the origin of actions. Rather, they argue, it would 
suffice if the agent had a basal concept of himself rooted in his bodily self-perception 
which they term essential prehension – in opposition to John Perry’s [20] well-known 
problem of the essential indexical.  
In their initial argument, Anderson and Perlis use the example of the fictitious 
robotic agent JP-B4 that accumulates information about himself on a self-token3 ‘JP-
B4’ (he is thus expected to recognize, for instance, that he himself caused an oil 
stain). This self-token is a self-representation for JP-B4, if especially any physical 
action performed by JP-B4 which keeps his self-token as a direct object in the 
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to be understood as a ‘marker’ of some kind, indicating self-related information. 
description of the action, is directed towards himself within the world. To this end 
they need the assumption that JP-B4 has proprioceptive sensors reporting the spatial 
position of his limbs and his movable sensors. With this, JP-B4 is able to represent his 
body as an object (one of many) which, however, is made special due to the fact that 
the positions of perceived objects (such as the oil stain) can be determined relative to 
the agent. 
In the case of humans, too, Anderson and Perlis go on to argue, perception of one’s 
own body (somatoception) through the tactile sense, proprioception, etc. constitutes 
the basis of a physical self-representation fixed in the environment that is even 
required for actions as simple as reaching for an object and that is rooted in self-
identification. Analogous to JP-B4 they postulate as the only basis for this a special 
mental self-representing token (‘SR*’) that is to mark automatically somatoceptive 
information and that must also be present in mental representations of (initially 
physical) self-directed actions. This self-token may also serve to relate to oneself 
externally perceived informations and align those with body perception without the 
thinking of a self-symbol (indexical thoughts) being required.4 Finally, Anderson and 
Perlis argue that intentional and reflexive self-representations are the result of the 
cognitive system using the same token ‘SR*’ when representing intentional states,5 
and that a more comprehensive self-awareness is rooted herein. 
3.3   Implicit and Explicit Self-Knowledge (Beckermann) 
Beckermann [6] deals with the problem under what conditions cognitive systems (also 
artificial ones) – or ‘agents’, a term that is preferred here – may obtain an explicit 
form of self-awareness based on reflexive self-knowledge. He supports the thesis that 
cognitive agents6 may possess reflexive self-knowledge exactly when they make use 
of (meta)-representations concerning themselves and that are, in addition, coordinated 
with ‘agent-relative’ representations. 
Agent-relative knowledge is knowledge represented from the perspective of a 
particular agent. As long as the agent perceives the world and himself from his own 
perspective only, he does not need an explicit reference to himself (and, accordingly, 
no self-symbol) in his representations. Rather, he is able to generate representations 
on the basis of an implicit reference system in the center of which the agent himself is 
located. An example: ‘The apple nearby that can be reached for’ which he is able to 
grab without thinking ‘I’. Neither do sensations such as ‘the knee hurts’ require the 
reference to the ‘I’. Agent-relative representations thus only include knowledge about 
the way in which the perceived environment – including the bodily self-perception – 
is related to the agent. Since they are solely set up from his own perspective, such a 
representation does not require a self-symbol. 
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when touching one’s own body – leads to a connection of actions and effects of actions and, 
thus, to self-identification. 
5 If necessary, they allow the self-token also to be translated as ‘I’. 
6 Here, cognitive agents are understood as systems that represent their environment in an 
internal mental model in order to better cope with their environment. 
Now, under what conditions would an agent be forced to introduce an explicit 
representation of himself? This is discussed by Beckermann as follows, a fictitious 
agent called ‘AL’ serving as an example: When representing the perceived environ-
ment, AL introduces an internal name for each object – such as ‘object-6’, ‘object-7’, 
etc. – thus representing information about the objects, i.e., their type, properties and 
relations to other objects. This procedure does not require AL to introduce a name for 
himself – he does not see himself as an object. This becomes inevitable only when AL 
encounters an object in his environment that he identifies as another cognitive agent. 
For AL this other agent also constitutes an object for which AL introduces a name – 
for instance, ‘object-111’– whose behavior, however, actually depends on how the 
other one, for his part, represents the environment.  
To be able to predict the behavior of his fellow being, AL has to set up represen-
tations of the other’s (assumed) representations, i.e. meta-representations – a mental 
model of the other’s mental model. If, for instance, AL believes that the agent he calls 
‘object-111’ considers an item of the environment to be green – e.g., a sofa that AL 
calls ‘object-7’ –, or if AL believes that agent ‘object-111’ desires to sit down on 
‘object-7’ – the green sofa – he sets up agent-relative meta-representations as follows 
(‘believes’ and ‘wants’ in this case concern the intentional states the other agent is 
assumed to have): 
 
 (believes object-111 (color object-7 green)) 
 (wants object-111 (sitting-on object-7)) 
 
To be capable of representing which (assumed) representations the other one keeps 
about him, AL is forced to introduce an internal name for himself – such as ‘object-
100’. Only by means of this name for himself is he able, for instance, to represent 
adequately the other’s desire to obtain food from AL or the other’s belief that AL 
suffers from a hurting knee: 
 
 (wants object-111 (gives-food object-100 object-111)) 
 (believes object-111 (pain-in-the-knee object-100)) 
 
The crucial factor is that AL would now be able to establish a systematic relation 
between explicit representations that contain this new name (for himself) and his 
former agent-relative representations with implicit self-reference; i.e. (sitting-on 
object-7) refers to (sits-on object-100 object-7), meaning: if AL knows he is sitting on 
the green sofa AL realizes that the agent who is he himself is sitting on the sofa. In the 
same way, AL’s body perception could be represented not only in an agent-relative 
way but also explicitly, i.e. (pain-in-the-knee object-100), etc. And since AL’s agent-
relative representations correspond solely with his respective ‘object-100’ represen-
tations, the special role of the name ’object-100’ as a self-symbol is resulting.  
As a further effect, AL would also be able to generate meta-representations about 
himself, thus seeing himself from an external perspective, e.g. (desires object 100 
(sitting on object 7)). Only then would he know his own beliefs and desires, could 
develop explicit self-knowledge and, hence, self-awareness. Only then is it conceiva-
ble that AL – together with his fellow beings – develops a language which includes 
word symbols like ‘I’ and ‘you’. He would have learned the meaning of the word ‘I’, 
when he used it to express only such representations that are related to himself, i.e., he 
says ‘I’ only if he talks about himself.  
Hence, explicit self-knowledge (i.e. representations with a name for oneself) 
develops only in the social context: if a cognitive agent meets other cognitive agents 
and he realizes that – just as he does – they represent their environment and thus him, 
too.7 If the agent desires to represent for himself such representations of his fellow 
beings of which he is the object, he is forced to introduce his own internal name and 
make himself explicity an object of his representations. If he finally takes the step to 
bring his agent-relative representations in alignment with their explicitly self-related 
counterparts, he has got reflexive self-knowledge. 
4   Max as a Cognitive Agent  
Let us turn back to Max. Max is no fictitious robot but a fully implemented system 
that designs a humanoid agent in virtual reality. He is equipped with an articulate 
flexible body which – among other things – allows him to access parameters of his 
physis in order to enable him, e.g., to call up his position in the environment and his 
joint angles when planning his gestures; cf. Kopp and Wachsmuth [15]. As already 
mentioned above, our scenario deals with dialogs between a human and Max in the 
course of which a model airplane will be constructed. 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Present beliefs, behaviors, and goals of the Max system (from Kopp et al. [14]).  
 
                                                           
7 A bit trenchant: Hermits would be able to manage with agent-relative representations, i.e. 
implicit self-reference. 
As a cognitive agent, Max represents his (virtual) world in parts to be able to cope 
with the tasks when assisting the (virtual) construction of Baufix objects. For each 
Baufix object – either existing from the beginning or implemented later, e.g. aggre-
gated ones – he introduces a formal internal name such as ‘object-1’, ‘object-2’, etc. 
(It is not relevant here that within the system actually a symbol generator provides 
somewhat more differentiated ‘talking names’, see Figure 3). Furthermore, he records 
beliefs about the type of the parts and their position giving the vectors of a reference 
point of an object within the world coordinate system, for example as follows: 
 
 (type object-1 THREEHOLEBAR) 
 (position object-1 (2,3,5)) 
 (type object-2 THREEHOLEBAR) 
 (position object-2 (x,y,z)) 
 (type object-3 SLOTHEADSCREW-yellow) 
 (position object-3 (x’,y’,z’)) 
 
Changes of the scene are represented by Max real-time, for instance, by asserting 
(connected object-26 object-27) when the according parts are connected. Intentional 
states of his dialog partner have so far not been represented by Max. He represents, 
however, whose turn it is to speak. Various routines enable Max to identify turn sig-
nals of his dialog partner (turn-taking) and to know whether it is his turn or whether 
he wants to have it (having-turn Max true, want-turn Max true; see Figure 3).  
To organize the complex interplay of sensory, cognitive and actoric abilities, a 
cognitive architecture has been developed for Max [17], aiming at making his 
behavior appear believable, intelligent, and emotional. Here, ‘cognitive’ refers to the 
conception of structures and processes underlying mental activities. Fitted to his trial 
scenario, Max is equipped with limited knowledge of the world and is capable of 
planning and reasoning so that he may act as an intelligent assistant. Moreover he is 
equipped with reactive behaviors that enable him cope with disruptions and sudden 
changes.  
In a hybrid system architecture the Max system integrates symbol-processing and 
behavior-based approaches concerning perception, reactive behavior, higher mental 
processes such as reasoning and planned action, up to and including focused attention 
and action appraisal. The central part is a belief-desire-intention (BDI) interpreter. 
Due to the hybrid architecture Max is both able to conduct a dialog with planned 
utterances and to produce spontaneous utterances, e.g. in the form of turn-taking and 
feedback signals. Additionally, specialized planners – e.g., for constructing Baufix 
objects – and specialized memory stores – e.g., with dynamically updated represen-
tations for the state of constructed objects have been integrated.  
Explicitly represented goals (desires), which may be introduced through internal 
processing and through external influences as well, are serving as inner motivation 
that is triggering behavior. Intentions are generated by means of the BDI interpreter, 
which determines the current intention on the basis of existing beliefs, current desires 
and goals as well as the options for actions. Max can have several desires, the highest-
rated of which is selected by a utility function to become the current intention. 
Options for actions are available in the form of abstract plans that are described by 
preconditions, context conditions, consequences that may be accomplished, and a 
priority function. If a concrete plan drawn up on the basis of these facts has been 
executed successfully, the related goal will become defunct.  
The conduct of the dialog is based on an explicit modeling of communicative 
competences that are related to multimodal communicative acts [21] generalizing the 
speech act theory by Searle and Vanderveken [25]. Communicative acts are modeled 
as action-plan operators. The dialog is performed in accordance with the mixed 
initiative-principle, this means, for instance, that in case the human fails to answer, 
Max himself takes the initiative and acts as the speaker. The plan structure of the BDI 
module makes it possible to implement new goals during the performance of an 
intention that may replace the current intention, provided it has a higher priority. If 
the previous intention is not specifically abandoned in this process and its context 
conditions are still valid, it will become active again after the interruption. 
Max’s behavior is further influenced by (simulated) emotions, which determine as 
system parameters in which way Max performs actions. The emotive system is, on the 
one hand, fed by external stimuli (Max’s virtual physis, e.g., has touch-sensitive 
areas), and, on the other, by the cognitive system: reaching or failing to reach main 
goals generates positive or negative emotions, respectively, that affect the valences of 
mood of the emotional system, which, in turn, control Max’s unintentional external 
behavior. The emotional expression in Max’s face and voice caused thereby may 
convey feedback-signals to his opposite. In parallel action, mood valences occurring 
continuously in a three-dimensional abstract space are categorized and symbolically 
represented as explicit beliefs; so they may take effect when choosing between op-
tions for actions; cf. Becker et al. [5]. Max is also able to utter verbally symbolically 
represented emotional states (‘I am angry now’); in this sense, Max seems to be 
‘conscious’ of them. 
Now, what about the consciousness Max might actually have of himself as a sub-
ject? Insofar as his cognitive abilities are based on a BDI architecture, Max can be 
justifiably ascribed mentalistic attributes that may be characterized by terms such as 
knowledge, belief, intention. We may thus state, as an intermediate result, that Max 
not only represents his environment, he has also – in the discourse of the cooperative 
situation (constructing with Baufix) – intentional states (beliefs, desires/goals, and 
intentions), which constitutes him as being an intentional agent. But can – or could – 
he know about his intentional states and those of his dialog partners (more precisely, 
those he assumes his dialog partners to have)? A model enabling Max to make use of 
the corresponding meta-representations has so far been rudimentarily realized. Up to 
now it is only concerned with following up the role of the speaker as well as turn-
taking. This is an example, however, which can already serve to indicate to what 
extent Max requires reflexive knowledge. 
As already mentioned above, Max is able to identify turn signals of his dialog 
partner, i.e. that the other wants to take the role of the speaker (e.g., if the human 
interrupts him directly, says ‘Max!’ or raises his hand). Max actually represents his 
role as the speaker already with a self-symbol (having-turn Max true), even if this is 
unnecessary in a dyadic setting; an agent-relative representation would be entirely 
sufficient: (having-turn true) – or (having-turn false) if it is the other’s – the human’s 
– turn. Our next plans include to enable Max to have a reasonable conversation with 
more than one partner, thus he should be able to keep an account of who of those 
participating is speaking or wants to do so. It could be expected that for this he uses 
symbol names for his partners (having-turn Other-1, having-turn Other-2, etc.). But 
does this actually require him to have a self-symbol, as in (having-turn Max)?  Even if 
this social situation suggests recording the turn-holder by name, Max may still 
manage without a self-symbol, namely, by representing (having-turn true/false) 
whether he or someone else is speaking and by differentiating the others by name. To 
know explicitly ‘It’s my turn’, however, Max ought to have a self-symbol.  
Let’s look at the (as yet fictitious) situation where three agents – Other-1, Other-2, 
and Max – are having a conversation and are taking turns. As long as Max ‘wants’ to 
have his turn only to say something (want-turn true) he will just have to wait for a 
suitable opportunity. However, the conversational situation of explicitly passing the 
speaker-role also may occur (turn-giving), signalling to a direct addressee and to be 
understood as a call for action, i.e. taking the turn; cf. Sacks et al. [24]. In this case, 
however, Max should be in a position to recognize that he himself is the addressee 
and, for instance, represent (wants Other-2 (give-turn Other-2 Max)), etc. In other 
words, Max would then have – or require – some form of explicit self-awareness that 
allows him to differentiate between his own and a partner’s mental states. 
5   Criteria for a ‘Human’ Non-Human Consciousness  
In this paper we examined under what conditions an artifical agent may be able to 
communicate with some sort of consciousness of being an intentional agent, the agent 
Max embodied in virtual reality serving as an example. In particular, we asked what 
kind of cognitive conditions are required to enable Max to know of himself and 
understand intentions and perspectives of a dialog partner. May – some day – Max 
justifiably talk about himself as ‘I, Max’? But also: being a ‘virtual human’, might 
Max constitute a communication partner acceptable for humans?8  
Let’s return to the forms of consciousness first differentiated in the introduction, 
i.e. (1) consciousness of sensations, of the phenomenal quality of experiencing, (2) 
consciousness as knowledge of the physical identity, and (3) consciousness in the 
form of self-perception as an acting being, up to the self-perception as causing actions 
(here in particular: communicative actions). Let’s now consider to what extent that 
may seem attainable for the artificial agent Max. 
1. Qualia. Max can certainly not be ascribed sensations of the kind human beings 
have, since – due to his virtual body – he does not possess a neurophysiological basis 
required for qualitative experiencing. In this sense, the simulated emotional states can, 
for instance, not be experienced subjectively, this means that Max does not have 
feelings. Their functional role in the sense of behavior controlling appraisal, however, 
can be and has been modeled, at least to some extent – a mechanism of appraisal 
analogous to feelings, which, for instance, allows a differentiation between options 
for actions; see Stephan [27]. By means of such appraisal achieved through simulated 
emotions, Max might be able to develop preferences and directed attention. A positive 
                                                           
8 An indication that this question is not entirely odd is the fact that Max is frequently asked by 
visitors of the Heinz Nixdorf Museums-Forum ‘Are you a human being?’. 
or negative appraisal in achieving or failing communicative goals could to some 
extent be compared with emotional experiences. 
2. Self-identification. Regarding a consciousness as knowledge of the physical 
identity, the situation is quite different. This concerns the question as to whether Max 
can have a basal concept of himself that is rooted in the self-perception of his (virtual) 
physis (essential prehension in the sense of Anderson and Perlis [2], see Section 3.1). 
Let’s imagine the following experiment: In virtual reality, Max perceives his 
simulated – but not yet recognized – mirror image that moves exactly as Max does, 
e.g., when he places his hand on his left cheek (in our experimental system, touching 
Max’s left cheek gives Max’s emotive system a pleasant ‘feeling’). It appears 
technically possible that Max can align the action observed externally and perceived 
internally by means of a self-token as outlined in Section 3.2. This physically 
grounded self-token mediates an essential awareness of location that is important for 
acting in space, it is reference point for agent-relative representations and may be the 
starting point for references a self-symbol makes to the own ‘person’. 
3. Self-perception as an acting being, even including self-perception of having 
caused actions (here, in particular, communicative actions): For this, it is mandatory 
that Max has symbolic representations of his environment and knowledge about how 
to represent planned actions as goals. Max should in particular be able to represent 
those as being his goals for which, according to Anderson and Perlis [2], a self-token 
would suffice. This makes only sense altogether, however, if it can be interlinked. 
Only through self-identification of his own physis would Max be able to relate agent-
relative knowledge to himself, by coupling it to a self-token (which is hence grounded 
in his physis). Only then could he perceive himself as the origin of actions. Only by 
introducing a self-token into the representations of actions could he perceive himself 
as causing actions, i.e. establish causal relations between his actions and the effects 
they trigger.  
On the basis of the ideas explained in Section 4, Max can be understood as a 
system perceiving and representing his environment and drawing conclusions in order 
to cope with the situation. It seems, in fact, relatively easy to construct the Max 
system in a way that all his agent-relative representations are automatically marked  
as his own by means of a self-token. According to the above thoughts, however, 
conscious self-awareness is coupled to explicit self-knowledge, that is, Max would 
require explicit self-representations incorporating a symbol name for himself, which 
express Max’s view onto himself from an external perspective. To reach this, first of 
all representational states of the agent on their part must be made the object of 
representations, i.e. meta-representations need to be set up:  
4. Meta-representations. Clearly, by means of the conditions created by a BDI 
architecture (see Section 4) it appears possible to configurate Max in a way that 
enables him to set up meta-representations. A more difficult question is how to create 
an experimental situation that allows Max to set up a reflexive meta-representation. 
According to Beckermann (see Section 3.3), a social situation may be a suitable basis 
on which Max sets up assumed representations of a communication partner that deal 
with himself and that he would have to coordinate with corresponding Max-relative 
representations just as described. As a first step, a turn-taking situation as explained 
above appears suitable. In this context, Max must be able to set up also expressions in 
symbolic representations that allow him to make propositions on propositions, even 
including propositions on himself, such as ‘the other wants me, Max, to take the turn’. 
Max should then be able to derive an according intention that makes him take the 
turn. 
Let’s suppose we succeeded in fulfilling such conditions (at least 2-4) for Max 
altogether. Then we would have to admit Max to be able to communicate as an 
intentional agent that has self-perception as an acting being. Just as Max would have 
representational states bearing his intentions, desires and goals, he would be able to 
ascribe such states to humans. And vice versa, it would then be entirely justified if a 
human being ascribed him, too, intentions, desires and goals that Max relates to 
himself, i.e., that are his own.  
Yet, the fact that Max’s knowledge of his own states would be limited to the 
moment only would remain rather unsatisfactory; this could still not be considered 
profound knowledge of himself (autonoetic consciousness). If Max did not know 
what he did yesterday or what he could be doing tomorrow, he would not have an ‘I’ 
persisting across time. A further important criterion thus is: 
5. Memory. Max should not only be able to remember who (or whether he) 
triggered an action, he should also be able to recognize if an event is absolutely new 
to him, that he cannot remember having experienced before. In order to be aware of 
being confronted with a new event for the first time, Max should be able to have 
access to his personal history. He would need an autobiographical memory that en-
ables him, – with reference to his communication partners – to ascertain, ‘Yesterday I 
constructed a plane with you for the first time’ or ‘I have often (or never) constructed 
a plane with you’. This requires him, however, to be able to store memories of such 
an event in appropriate form. If it happened to him a repeated time, it should be 
possible to revise the uniqueness of the memory, up to daily experience.  
How to realize such an autobiographical memory in the case of Max? As described 
above (Section 4) the behavior-triggering impetus of Max is based on explicitly 
represented goals. As a starting point for an autobiographical memory, Max may set 
up a record in appropriate form (marked with a time stamp and his self-token), when 
one of his goals has been achieved, or failed. It would probably not be helpful if Max 
stored a record for any processed (sub)goal; there would be far too many marginal 
ones that are of only temporary importance. Rather, the goals should be evaluated 
with respect to their significance. Such can be done by the emotive system, by 
coupling any goal reached and any goal failed with a positive or negative emotion 
(pleasure or anger), with ‘higher’ goals triggering stronger and sub-goals less 
emotional reactions. Permanency of storing memories can be made dependent on the 
strength of the emotional reaction, thus assuring that memories of main goals remain 
more pronounced. An adjustment of new and recorded former goals could, in turn, be 
evaluated emotionally. A goal that frequently failed and has now been achieved for 
the first time could give rise to Max’s ‘joyful excitement’ and lead to a lasting, ‘I’- 
related memory. 
We now see the following picture of artificial consciousness developing: criteria 
required are self-identification, self-perception as an acting being, meta-representa-
tions and memories related to emotional appraisal. Given these conditions, it appears 
possible that Max approaches forms of ‘human’ (comparable to a human being’s) 
consciousness and self-identity. The higher the degree of similarity, the more justi-
fiably Max could talk of himself as ‘I, Max’, and the better Max might be acceptable 
as a social partner, as a ‘human machine’ for human beings. 
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